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The Ohio Rules of Evidence were promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rulemaking authority. See Ohio Canst. art.
IV,§ 5(8). They became effective on July 1, 1980.
The Rules of Evidence change Ohio law in a number of respects. Some of the more important
changes in criminal cases include:
Opinion Evidence. Rules 405(A) and 608(A) permit the use of opinion evidence to prove character.
Prior law generally authorized only the use of reputation evidence to prove character.
Voucher Rule. Rule 607 abolishes the Ohio
voucher rule, which prohibited a party from impeaching its own witness. There is, however, an
important exception. Surprise and affirmative damage are required before a party may impeach its
own witness with a prior inconsistent statement.
Prior Convictions. Rule 609(A) limits the types of
convictions that may be used to impeach. No
longer are all felony and misdemeanor convictions
admissible. Ordinance violations, however, may be
admissible. In addition, Rule 609(8) generally
prohibits the impeachment use of convictions over
ten years old.
Refreshing Recollection. Rule 612 empowers the
trial judge, under certain circumstances, to compel
production of writings used prior to trial to refresh
a witness' recolleciion.
Hypothetical Questions. Rule 705 makes the use
of the hypothetical question in eliciting expert
opinion testimony optional.
Prior Statements. Rule 801(D)(1)(a) changes Ohio
law by permitting some types of prior inconsistent
statements to be admitted for substantive, rather
than impeachment, purposes. This exception is
limited to prior statements given under oath, subject to penalty of perjury, and subject to crossexamination at the time the statement was made.

Rule 801(D)(1)(b) permits prior consistent statements to be used as substantive evidence if offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication.
Res Gestae. The confusing and ambiguous term
res gestae is not used in the Rules of Evidence. In
many cases, so-called res gestae statements are
not hearsay as defined in Rule 801(A)-(C). In other
cases, such statements may fall within one of the
enumerated hearsay exceptions: present sense impressions, Rule 801(1); excited utterances, Rule
803(2); or statements relating to presently existing
mental or physical condition, Rule 803(3).
Former Testimony. Rule 804(8)(1) excludes preliminary hearing testimony from the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.
Declarations Against Penal Interests. Rule
804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for statements against penal interests. If offered to exculpate or inculpate an accused, such statements
must be corroborated.
Best Evidence Rule. Rule 1003 makes duplicates, as defined in Rule 1001, generally admissible on the same basis as originals.
This is the first in a series of articles examining
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal
cases.
BACKGROUND
The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Ohio Rules of Evidence are patterned after
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, an
appreciation of the Federal Rules is necessary for
understanding the Ohio Rules. The Federal Rules
were promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
November 1972 and were transmitted to Congress
in February 1973. See 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). The federal drafjing committee had been appointed in
1965 and had published drafts in 1969 and 1971.
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See 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (preliminary draft); 51
F.R.D. 315 (1971) (revised draft). These drafts are
important because in some instances the Ohio
Rules of Evidence follow one of the drafts rather
than the Federal Rules as enacted. E.g., Rule 403
(exclusion of relevant evidence); Rule 611(B) (scope
of cross-examination).
Congress reacted to the Court-promulgated rules
by enacting legislation that deferred the effective
date of the Federal Rules, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 ·
Stat. 9 (1973), and extensive hearings on the Federal Rules were held during 1973-74. See Proposed
Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Gong., 1st
Sess. (1973); Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
93d Gong., 2d Sess. (1974). In 1975 the Federal
Rules emerged from Congress in statutory form.
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Congress
amended the Court-promulgated rules in numerous
respects. Perhaps the most significant change involved the law of privilege. The Court had proposed 13 specific rules on that subject; Congress
deleted all, substituting a general provision which
left the law of privilege undisturbed. See Fed. R.
Evid. 501. In addition, Rule 609, which governs the
impeachment use of prior convictions, was the
subject of controversy and amendment. The legislative history of these amendments is found in the
various committee reports as well as in the Congressional Record. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [19741 U.S.
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075; S. Rep. No. 1277,
93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. code
Gong. & Ad. News 7051; H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d
Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Gong. & Ad. News 7098 (conference report). These
reports are valuable resources for interpreting the
Ohio as well as Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have had a substantial impact on the state level. They have been
adopted with various amendments in twenty-two
jurisdictions and are being considered for adoption
in half-a-dozen other states. Moreover, in 1974 the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) to conform to the
Federal Rules.
The Ohio Rules
The drafting of the Ohio Rules of Evidence commenced in 1975 with the appointment of an Advisory Committee. See O'Neill, Introduction, Symposium: The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev.
515 (1977); Miller, The Game Plan: Drafting the
Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev. 549
(1977). A draft of the Rules was published in 1976,
see 49 Ohio Bar 929 (1976), and the Court promulgated the Rules for the first time in January 1977.
See 50 Ohio Bar 231 (1977).
The General Assembly, however, exercised its
constitutional prerogative and disapproved the
Rules. Disapproval was based on several concerns:
(1) that the formulation of rules of evidence was a

legislative, rather than judicial, function; (2) that a
number of rules were substantive, rather than procedural, and thus beyond the Court's rulemaking
authority under section 5(B), article IV of the Ohio
Constitution; (3) that the need for rules of evidence
had not been demonstrated; and (4) that certain
rules, particularly those recognizing the exercise of
discretion by trial courts, were undesirable. For a
discussion of this controversy, see Giannelli, The
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 Case W.
Res. L Rev. 16 (1978); Walinski & Abramoff, The
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case
Against, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 344 (1978).
The Rules were again proposed and disapproved
in 1978. See 51 Ohio Bar 181 (1978). After substantial amendments were made, the Rules were pro~
posed by the Court for a third time in 1980. In the
absence of a resolution of disapproval, the Rules
became effective in July 1980.
References
The Rules of Evidence, along with the Staff
Notes and the Federal Advisory Committee's
Notes, are contained in Ohio Rules of Evidence
Handbook (P. Giannelli ed. 1980) (Banks-Baldwin
Pub. Co.). In addition, several law review articles
on the Rules have·been published. See Philipps, A
Guide to the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 5
Ohio North. U.L. Rev. 28 (1978); Symposium, The
Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U. Rev. 515-634
(1977). Care must be exercised in consulting these
articles because they were written prior to the
1980 amendments.
A number of treatises on the Federal Rules of
Evidence have been authored. The multi-volume
references include: D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence (Lawyers Co-Operative Pub. Co.); J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
(Matthew Bender); and 21 & 22 C. Wright & K.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure (West
Pub. Co.). There is one single volume text: S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual (2d ed. 1977) (Michie Co.).
RULE 101: SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
Rule 101 contains the applicability provision for
the Rules of- Evidence. According to Rule 101(A),
the Rules of Evidence apply in proceedings in all
state courts and in all proceedings before courtappointed referees unless an exception is recognized. Rules 101(B) and (C) specify the exceptions.
Court-appointed referees are rarely encountered
in criminal practice. In juvenile cases, however,
court-appointed referees are used frequently. The
Rules of Evidence, however, may not always apply
in proceedings before court-appointed referees be·
cause Rule 101(C)(6) carves out an exception for
"[p]roceedings in which other rules prescribed by
the supreme court govern matters relating to evidence." For example, Juvenile Rule 40(B) provides
that a referee "may rule upon the admissibility of
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order o1
reference .... " Consequently, an order of refer2

ence may preclude a court-appointed referee from
applying the Rules of Evidence. See Staff Note,
Rule 101.
Rule 101 makes no distinction between the applicability of the Rules of Evidence in civil and
criminal cases. Nevertheless, a number of specific
rules recognize such a distinction - for example,
Rule 803(8) contains a special limitation on the use
of public records in criminal cases and Rule
804(8)(3) imposes a corroboration requirement on
the use of declarations against penal interests in
criminal cases. Similarly, a number of rules apply
only in civil cases. E.g., Rule 407 (subsequent remedial measures); Rule 408 (compromises and offers of compromise); Rule 411 (liability insurance).
Moreover, the Rules of Evidence generally do
not codify constitutional principles. Consequently,
in criminal prosecutions the Rules of Evidence
must be applied in light of constitutional provisions which relate to evidentiary matters. For example, the Confrontation Clause may require the
exclusion of a hearsay statement, even if that
statement falls within a hearsay exception recognized in Rules 803 and 804. In California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court commented: "While it may readily be conceded that
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Cl-ause are
generally designed to protect similar values, it is
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap
is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is
nothing more or less than a codification of the
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law." /d. at 155.
Rule 101 also makes no distinction between the
applicability of the Rules of Evidence in jury and
bench trials. Nevertheless, evidentiary rules have
not been applied in same manner in cases tried
before a jury and cases tried before a judge. This
does not mean that a trial judge is free to ignore
the Rules of Evidence in a bench trial. It does
mean, however, that appellate courts will not as
readily find error in a bench trial. See State v.
Eubanks, 60 OS(2d) 183, 187, 398 NE(2d) 561, 570
(1980) ("[A] judge is presumed to consider only the
relevant, material and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively
appears from the record."); State v. White, 15
OS(2d) 146, 151, 239 NE(2d) 65, 70 (1968).

Extradition and Rendition. Rule 101(C)(3) exempts extradition and rendition proceedings from
the Rules of Evidence. These proceedings are exempted because they "are essentially administrative in character. Traditionally the rules of evidence have not applied." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 1101. Extradition and rendition
proceedings are governed by R.C. ch. 2963. They
are also governed by federal law. Article 4, section
2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution reads: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice; and be
found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime." This constitutional provision is enforced by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3182.
Sentencing and Probation. Rule 101(C)(3) also exempts sentencing and probation proceedings from
the Rules of Evidence. "The rules of evidence have
not been regarded as applicable to sentencing or
probation proceedings, where great reliance is
placed upon the presentence investigation and report." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid.
1101. Sentencing hearings are governed by Criminal Rules 32 and 32.2 See also R.C. ch. 2929
(Penalties and Sentencing); R.C. ch. 2967 (Probation). Revocation of probation is governed by Criminal Rule 32.3. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court
has required probation revocation proceedings to
satisfy due process standards. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 us 778 (1973).
In contrast to probation, which is a judicial function, the granting and revoking of parole is an executive function and, therefore, is not governed by
the Rules of Evidence because the regulation of
executive department functions is beyond the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority. Parole is governed by R.C. ch. 2967 (Pardon and Parole) and
R.C. ch. 5149 (Adult Parole Authority). In addition,
the U.S. Supreme Court has required parole revocation hearings to satisfy due process standards.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471 (1972). See also
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1 (1979) (parole release).
Warrants and Summons. Rule 101(C)(3) also exempts proceedings for the issuance of warrants
and summons. "Warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants are issued upon
complaint or affidavit showing probable cause ....
The nature of the proceedings makes application
of the formal rules of evidence inappropriate and
impracticable." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.
R. Evid. 1101. The issuance of arrest warrants and
summons are governed by Criminal Rules 4 and 9;
search warrants are governed by Criminal Rule 41.
Release on Bail. Rule 101(C)(3) also exempts proceedings involving pretrial release from the Rules
of Evidence. Release on bail or personal recognizance is governed by Criminal Rule 46. Release on
bail pending appeal is governed by Appellate
Rule 8. Detention pending adjudication in juvenile
cases is governed by Juvenile Rule 7.

Exemptions

Rule 101(C) specifies a number of exemptions to
the applicability of the Rules of Evidence, a number of which apply in criminal proceedings.
Grand Jury Proceedings. Rule 101(C)(2) exempts
grand jury proceedings from the Rules of Evidence.
The rationale for exempting grand jury proceedings
is set forth in Costello v. United States, 350 US 359
(1965). In that case the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the use of hearsay evidence in grand jury proceedings. Applying the hearsay rule, according to the
Court, "would run counter to the whole history of
the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct
their inquiries unfettered by technical rules."
!d. at 364.
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Contempt Proceedings. Rule 101(C)(4) exempts
summary contempt proceedings from the Rules of
Evidence. The Ohio Staff Note defines summary
contempt as contempt "committed in the view or
hearing of the court, but not when the contempt is
committed other than in the actual presence of the
court." In short, summary contempt involves direct
contempt (in the presence of the court) as opposed
to indirect contempt.
Other Rules. Rule 101(C)(6) exempts from the
Rules of Evidence proceedings in which other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court govern evidentiary matters. Consequently, if the Rules of Evidence conflict with any other rule prescribed by
the Supreme Court, the "other rule" controls. For
example, Criminal Rule 47 authorizes the use of affidavits in support of motions in criminal cases
and Juvenile Rule 7(F)(3) provides that a court may
consider any evidence in a detention hearing
"without regard to formal rules of evidence."
Privilege
Rule 101(B) provides that the law of privilege applies "at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings conducted under these rules." Privileges
are singled out for special treatment because disclosure of privileged information would defeat the
policy reasons underlying the various rules of privilege. Thus, even if one of the exceptions in Rule
101(C) makes the Rules of Evidence inapplicable,
the law of privilege nevertheless applies.
There is one significant problem with Rule
101(8). The drafters of the Rules of Evidence distinguished the spousal privilege relating to confidential communications, R.C. 2317.02(0) & 2945.42,
from the spousal testimonial privilege applicable
in criminal cases, Rule 601(B). By treating the latter privilege as a rule of competence in Rule
601(8), the drafters have produced an anomalous
result. Apparently, Rule 601(B) would apply at trial
but not at a grand jury hearing because grand jury
hearings are exempted from the Rules of Evidence
pursuant to Rule 101(C)(2) and Rule 601(B) is not a
rule of privilege under Rule 101(B).

In Batts the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant could be impeached with extrinsic evidence of prior conduct not resulting in a conviction, even though Federal Rule 608(B) expressly
prohibited the use of such extrinsic evidence. The
court based its result, in part, on Federal Rule 102.
Batts raised the spectre, according to critics, that
a "trial judge [has] discretion to ignore a rule of
evidence, even one that Congress chose to make
mandatory, if he believes that the whole 'truth' as
he perceived it, might not be served." Walinski and
Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence:
The Case Against, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 344,
369-70 (1978). See also Note, United States v.
Batts: Aberration or Permissible Construction
Under the Rules of Evidence?, 9 Toledo L. Rev. 464
(1978). According to Staff Note, the language of
Federal Rule 102 concerning "promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence" was deleted in order to avoid the expansive construction
of Batts.
Second, Rule 102 sets forth two rules of construction not found in Federal Rule 102: (1) The
Rules of Evidence are to be construed to state the
common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that a change in the common law is intended, and (2) the Rules of Evidence are to be
construed so as not to supersede substantive statutory provisions.
In determining whether the Rules were intended
to change the common law, the Ohio Staff Notes
should be consulted first. Most of the Staff Notes
contain statements indicating whether a particular
rule would change prior Ohio law. The legislative
history of the Federal Rules - the Advisory Committee's Notes and the congressional committee
reports - will also shed light on this issue, especially in those instances in which the federal and
Ohio rule are identical.
The reference to substantive statutory provisions
in Rule 102 was intended to incorporate section
5(B), article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which
reads, in part: "The supreme court shall prescribe
rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right." As was
noted above, this issue played a critical role in the
General Assembly's disapproval of the Rules in
1977 and 1978. The line between substance and
procedure is a difficult one to draw and a detailed
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this article. See generally, Morgan, Rules of Evidence - Substantive or Procedural?, 10 Vand. L.
Rev. 467 (1957); Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
16, 33-58 (1978).
The Rules of Evidence, as finally adopted, contain a compromise on this issue. A number of
rules are considered substantive in nature and, in
those instances, statutory enactments are not
superseded by the Rules. For example, the rape
shield statute, Rule 404(A), the law of privilege,
Rule 501, and the impeachment of a witness by

RULE 102: PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION
Rule 102 contains the purpose and construction
clause for the Rules of Evidence. It reads:
The purpose of these rules is to provide procedures
for the adjudication of causes to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. These rules shall be construed to state the
common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates
that a change is intended and shall not supersede
substantive statutory provisions.

Rule 102 differs from its federal counterpart in
several respects. First, the introductory clause to
Federal Rule 102 has been deleted; that clause
provides that the Federal Rules shall be construed
to secure the "promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence." The deletion of this
language can be traced directly to United States v.
Batts, 558 F(2d) 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn, 573
F(2d) 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 859 (,1978).
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use of a prior juvenile adjudication, Rule 609(0),
are considered substantive. All other rules are considered procedural and conflicting statutes are
superseded.

578 F(2d) 136, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Johnson, 577 F(2d) 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rule 103(A)(1) requires objections to be timely. If
a question is improper, an objection should be
made immediately. See Gates v. Dills, 13 App(2d)
163, 164, 234 NE(2d) 604, 605 (1967) ("Ordinarily, an
objection to incompetent and improper testimony
must be made with reasonable promptness."). In
some instances, however, it will not be apparent
that a question will elicit an objectionable
response. In such cases, a motion to strike is required. See Johnson v. English 5 App(2d) 109, 214
NE(2d) 254 (1966). Jf a motion to strike is granted,
the jury should be instructed to disregard the evidence. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.10 (1974)
(Provisional). "Timeliness" in some instances requires that an objection be made prior to trial. For
example, objections based on violations of constitutional rights frequently must be made in the form
of a pretrial motion to suppress. Criminal Rule
12(8)(3) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evidence, including but not limited to statemen.ts and
identification testimony, on the ground that 1t was
illegally obtained" must be raised prior to trial.
Rule 103 requires specific, as opposed to general, objections; that is, the grounds upon which
the objection is based must accompany the objection unless the grounds are apparent from the context. Statements such as "I object," "Objection, inadmissible," and "Objection, il'lcompetent" are
general objections. Objection on the ground that
evidence is "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial" is also considered a general objection. See C.
McCormick, Evidence 116 (2d ed. 1972). All
grounds for objection should be specified at the
time the objection is made. "The general rule regarding specific objections is that one who has .
made specific objections to the admission of evidence thereby waives all other objections and cannot assert such other grounds in the appellate
court." Johnson v. English, 5 App(2d) 109, 113, 214
N E(2d) 254, 257 (1966).

RULE 103: RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
Rule 103 specifies the procedures relating to rulings on evidentiary issues. It covers such matters
as plain and harmless error, objections and offers
of proof, and out-of-court hearings.
Harmless Error
Rule 103(A) provides that a case will not be reversed on appeal because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the ruling involves a "substantial right" and the other procedural requirements
of Rule 103, such'as a timely objection, have been
satisfied. The term "substantial right" is not defined in the rule, but the Staff Note clearly indicates that the term refers to the harmless error
doctrine. Criminal Rule 52(A) contains a provision
on harmless error: "Any error, defect, irregularity,
or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded."
In criminal trials, errors involving federal constitutional rights must be judged by the federal standard. Under this standard, the state must "prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967). See generally, 88 Moore's Federal Practice
ch. 52 (1980); Field, Assessing the Harmlessn_ess
of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process rn
Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976);
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L.
Rev. 988 (1973).
The federal standard (beyond a reasonable
doubt) established in Chapman has been adopted
by the Ohio Supreme Court in reviewing nonconstitutional error in criminal cases. In State v. Bayless,
48 OS(2d) 73, 357 NE(2d) 1035 (1976), the Supreme
Court wrote:
Error in the admission of evidence in criminal pro·
ceedings is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence may have contributed to the
accused's conviction. In order to hold the error harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(syllabus, para. 7). Accord, State v. Eubank, 60 OS(2d)
183, 398 NE(2d) 567 (1980).

Offers of Proof
When evidence has been excluded by a ruling of
the trial judge, Rule 103(A)(2) requires an offer of
proof. In Pokorny v. Local 310, 35 App(2d) 178, 300
N E(2d) 464 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 38
OS(2d) 177, 311 NE(2d) 866 (1974), the court held:
"When a court sustains objections to a question a
statement must be made or proffered as to what
the expected answer would be in order that a reviewing court can determine whether or not the action of the trial court is prejudicial; and in the absence of a proffer, the exclusion of evidence may
not be assigned as error." !d. at 184; 300 N E(2d) at
468-69.
An offer of proof may take several forms. An
offer of testimonial evidence typically takes the
form of a statement by counsel as to the content
of the expected testimony. The court, however,
may require or be asked to take the "offer" by an
examination of the witness, including crossexamination. See Rule 103(8) (court "may direct

Objections
Rule 103(A)(1) requires an objection or motion to
strike in order to preserve a challenge to the admissibility of evidence. A failure to object or to
move to strike is considered a waiver of the objection and the issue will not be reviewed on appeal.
See State v. Gordon, 28 OS(2d) 45, 276 NE(2d) 243
(1971); State v. Lancaster, 25 OS(2d) 83, 267 N E(2d)
291 (1971). This rule, however, is subject to the
plain error doctrine. Another consequence of failing to object is that the evidence becomes part of
the record of trial and may be considered by the
trier of fact, by the trial court in ruling on motions,
and by a reviewing court. See Hastings v. Bonner,
5

the making of an offer in question and answer
form"). Excluded documentary evidence should be
marked for identification and appended to the record of trial.
There are several exceptions to the offer of proof
requirement. First, an offer is not necessary when
the substance of the excluded evidence is "apparent from the context .... " Second, unlike Federal
Rule 103, Rule 103(A)(2) provides that an offer of
proof is not required if evidence is excluded during
cross-examination. See Burt v. State, 23 OS 394
(1872); State v. Debo, 8 App(2d) 325, 222 NE(2d) 656
(1966). Finally, the offer of proof requirement is
subject to the plain error doctrine.

affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of
the court."
The plain error rule only applies to errors affecting substantial rights. In State v. Craft, 52 App(2d)
1, 367 N E(2d) 1221 (1977), the court offered the following definition of plain error:
[O]bvious error prejudicial to a defendant, ... which involves a matter of great public interest having substantial adverse impact on the integrity of and the
public's confidence in judicial proceedings. The error
must be obvious on the records, palpable, and fundamental, and in addition it must occur in exceptional
circumstances where the appellate court acts in the
public interest because the error affects "the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceeding."
/d. at 7, 367 NE{2d) at 1225-26.

Hearing of Jury
Rule 103(C) requires discussions involving the
admissibility of evidence to be held outside the
hearing of the jury whenever practicable. Rule
104(C) contains a similar provision. The trial judge
has discretion to require either a side-bar conference or an out-of-court hearing. In addition, evidentiary issues may be raised prior to trial either at a
pretrial conference, see Grim. R. 17.1, or by means
of a motion in limine.
Although not specifically mentioned by the
Rules of Evidence, motions in limine have often
been used to resolve evidentiary issues. See
United States v. Cook, 608 F(2d) 1175 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Oakes, 565 F( 2d) 170 (1st
Cir. 1977); C. McCormick, Evidence 17 (2d ed. 1978
Supp.); Annat., 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975).
In State v. Spahr, 47 App(2d) 221, 353 NE(2d) 624
(1976), the court commented on the use of motions
in limine:

RULE 104: PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
Rule 104 governs preliminary questions relating
to the admissibility of evidence. The rule generally
follows prior Ohio law. The concept of conditional
relevancy recognized in Rule 104(B), however, is
new.
Rule 104(A) follows the traditional practice of allocating to the trial judge the responsibility for ruling on the admissibility of evidence. See Potter v.
Baker, 162 OS 488, 500, 124 NE(2d) 140, 146 (1955)
("It is elementary that the trial judge is to decide
those questions of fact which must be decided in
order to determine whether certain evidence is admissible."). Rule 104(B), however, carves out an exception for preliminary questions involving issues
of conditional relevancy.
Pursuant to Rule 104(A), the trial judge decides
as a preliminary matter the "qualification of a person to be a witness," including the competency of
witnesses under Rule 601 and the qualifications of
experts under Rule 702. The judge also decides the
"existence of a privilege" under Rule 501. Finally,
the judge decides as a preliminary matter the "admissibility of evidence" - for example, whether a
statement is hearsay, Rule 801, and if an exception
to the hearsay rule applies, Rules 803 and 804.
According to Rule 104(A), the trial judge, when
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, is "not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges." A similar provision is found
in Rule 101(C)(1). See generally United States v.
Matlock, 415 US 164, 172-73 (1974) ("[T]he rules of
evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do
not operate with full force at hearings before the
judge to determine the admissibility of evidence.");
C. McCormick, Evidence§ 53(2d ed. 1972).
The principal controversy concerning Federal
Rule 104 has involved its application when a trial
court is required to determine as a preliminary
matter the existence of a conspiracy in deciding
the admissibility of coconspirator's statements.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In other words, can the
judge consider the statement itself in determining
whether or not a conspiracy exists? This issue has
been resolved in the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Rule
801(D)(2)(e) requires "independent proof of the

There is no provision under the rules or the statutes
for a motion in limine. The request was no more and
no less than an appeal to the trial court for a precautionary instruction to opposing counsel to avoid error
or prejudice, such instruction to be effective until admissibility was resolved. Such a request lies in the inherent power and discretion of the trial judge to control the proceedings. /d. at 224, 353 NE(2d) at 626-27.

The trial court's authority to consider motions in
limine under the Rules of Evidence is found in
Rule 611(A), which recognizes the court's general
authority to control the presentation of evidence.
Motions in limine should be distinguished from
motions to suppress. Suppression motions are
governed by Criminal Rule 12(B)(3) and are generally required to be made prior to trial.
Plain Error
Rule 103(D) recognizes the plain error doctrine,
under which an appellate court may consider an
evidentiary error even though a party has failed to
make an objection, a motion to strike, or an offer
of proof at trial. The purpose of the plain error doctrine is to "safeguard the right of a defendant to a
fair trial, notwithstanding his failure object in timely fashion to error at that trial." State v. Valery, 46
OS(2d) 316, 327, 348 N E(2d) 351, 359 (1979), cert.
denied, 429 US 932 (1976). Criminal Rule 52(B)
specifically recognizes the plain error doctrine in
criminal cases; it provides: "Plain error or defects
6

conspiracy."
Conditional Relevancy
Rule 104(B), governing preliminary questions of
conditional relevancy, operates as an exception to
Rule 104(A). The drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence explained conditional relevancy as
follows:

examination on preliminary matters was considered necessary because Rule 611(B) adopts the
wide-open rule on scope of cross-examination in
all other proceedings.
As both the Ohio Staff Note and federal Advisory Committee's Note indicate, Rule 104(C) does
not address the issue of whether the accused's
testimony on a preliminary matter can be subsequently used at trial. Both the Ohio and federal
notes cite several decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377
(1968), the Court held that testimony given by a defendant during a suppression hearing in order to
establish standing to object to illegally seized evidence could not be used against the defendant at
trial on the issue of guilt. Whether the Simmons
rule extends to the impeachment use of suppression hearing testimony has not yet been decided
by the Court. The Court specifically reserved that
question in United States v. Salvucci, 100 S Ct
2547 (1980).
In Harris v. New York, 401 US 222 (1971), the
Court held that statements obtained in violation of
Miranda could be used to impeach a defendant at
trial. See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 US 714 (1975).
Similarly, the Court has permitted the impeachment use of evidence seized in violation of Fourth
Amendment rights. United States v. Havens, 100 S
Ct 1912 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 US 62
(1954).

In some situations, the relevancy of an item of evidence, in the large sense, depends upon the existence
of a particular preliminary fact. Thus when a spoken
statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is
without probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter
purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish an
admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y
wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this sense has
been labeled "conditional relevancy." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104.

If a preliminary question involves an issue of
conditional relevancy, the trial judge's function is
limited. He does not decide such questions exclusively or with finality, as is the case with preliminary questions under Rule 104(A). Rather, the trial
judge determines only if sufficient evidence has
been introduced "to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." If this standard is satisfied, the evidence is admitted for the jury's
consideration.
Rule 104(B) is a provision of general applicability. Several specific rules represent specialized applications of the concept of conditional relevancy.
For example, in applying the firsthand knowledge
rule, the trial judge does not decide whether or not
a witness has firsthand knowledge; he decides only
whether sufficient evidence has been introduced
"to support a finding that [the witness) has personal knowledge of the matter." Rule 602. Similarly, when ruling on the authentication of a document, the trial judge does not decide whether the
proffered document is genuine or not; his decision
is limited to determining whether there is "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Rule
,--901(A). See also Rule 1008.
Hearing of the Jury
Rule 104(C), requiring the court to hold an out-of- court hearing when ruling on the admissibility of a
confession, is constitutionally mandated as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (1964). See also
State v. Wigglesworth, 18 OS(2d) 171, 248 NE(2d)
607 (1969). This provision should be invoked rarely
because Criminal Rule 12(B)(3) requires the admissibility of confessions, which are challenged on
constitutional grounds, to be raised prior to trial by
a motion to suppress. Rule 104(C) also provides
that hearings "on other preliminary matters shall
be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when
the interests of justice require." A similar provision
is found in Rule 103(C).
Testimony by the Accused
Rule 104(0) limits the scope of cross-examination when a criminal defendant testifies on a preliminary matter. A specific rule on cross-

Weight and Credibility
Rule 104(E) concerns the right of a party to introduce evidence relevant to weight and credibility.
The purpose of this provision is to make clear that
a court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence
does not curtail the right of a party to dispute the
reliability of admitted evidence before the jury. For
example, if the court determines, as a matter of
constitutional law, that a confession is voluntary,
the defendant may nevertheless introduce before
the jury evidence challenging the reliability of the
confession. See State v. Wigglesworth, 18 OS(2d)
171, 248 N E(2d) 607 (1969).
RULE 105: LIMITED ADMISSIBiliTY
Rule 105 recognizes the principle of limited admissibility. An item of evidence may be admissible
if offered for one purpose but inadmissible if offered for another purpose. Evidence also may be
admissible against one party, but not against another party. In such cases Rule 105 applies and the
court, upon request, is required to instruct the jury
as to the limited purpose of the evidence. The rule
does not preclude the trial judge from giving such
a limiting instruction sua sponte. See generally 4
Ohio Jury Instructions§ 402.60 (1970) (limited purpose evidence).
A limiting instruction could be given either at
the time the evidence is admitted or at the close
of the case. The prior Ohio cases provide little
guidance. In Barnett v. State, 104 OS 298, 135 NE
647 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a limiting
instruction could be given at the time of admission
7

or in the general charge. In Brewing Co. v. Bauer,
50 OS 560, 35 NE 55 (1893), the Court required the
instruction to be given at the time the evidence
was received. The language of Rule 105 would
seem to require the instruction be given at the.
time the evidence is introduced. But see United
States v. Weil, 561 F(2d) 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Papia, 560 F(2d) 827, 839-40 (7th
Cir. 1977).
The failure of a party to request a limiting instruction has been held to cbnstitute a waiver. See
Alger v. Schine Theatrical Co., 59 App. 68, 17
NE(2d) 118 (1938). Not all the Ohio cases, however,
have applied the waiver rule. See Kroger Co. v.
McCarty, 111 App. 362, 172 NE(2d) 463 (1960). A
failure to request a limiting instruction should be
considered a waiver, except in those instances in
which the plain error rule applies, Rule 103(0). See
United States v. Vitale, 596 F(2d) 688, 689 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 US 868 (1979); United
States v. Sangrey, 586 F(2d) 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.
1978).
Evidence Admissible for One Purpose
There are numerous situations in which an item
of evidence may be admissible if offered for one
purpose, but inadmissible if offered for another
purpose. In some instances, the Rules of Evidence
specifically refer to this possibility. For example,
Rule 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be admissible for a number of
purposes, including proof of niotive, opportunity,
intent, or identity. Such evidence, however, "is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." An instruction limiting such evidence to its
proper purpose is appropriate. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions § 405.23 (1974) (Provisional).
In many cases, however, the Rules of Evidence
do not expressly refer to the doctrine of limited admissibility. Nevertheless, the doctrine applies. For
example, evidence of prior convictions typically is
admissible only for impeachment. See Rule 609.
Such evidence, however, could also be used as
character evidence, especially if the witness is the
accused. This latter use of prior conviction evidence is prohibited by Rule 404(A). An instruction
limiting the use of this type of evidence is appropriate. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions § 402.60 (1970);
4 /d. § 405.22 (1974} (Provisional).

joint trial of the confession of one defendant
which implicated a codefendant was insufficiant
to protect against the improper jury use of the confession. Once the Court concluded that there existed a substantial risk that the jury, despite the
cautionary instruction to the contrary, looked to
the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the petitioner's guilt, it ruled that the defendant had been denied his Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation because his right to crossexamine the codefendant about the statement had
been foreclosed. In subsequent decisions, the
Court held Bruton applicable to the state trials,
Roberts v. Russell, 392 US 293 (1968), and subject
to the harmless error doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 US 250 (1969).
There are several ways in which the Bruton
issue can be obviated. First, separate trials avoid
the problem raised in Bruton. If the codefendants
have been properly joined for trial under Criminal
Rule 8(B), the proper remedy is a motion to sever
for prejudice pursuant to Criminal Rules 12(B)(5)
and 14. The trial judge has discretion to grant such
a motion. If the codefendants have been improperly joined under Criminal Rule 8(B}, the proper
remedy is a motion for severance for misjoinder
pursuant to Criminal Rules 8 and 12(B)(2). In such
cases, the defendant need not show prejudice and
the trial judge must sever. Second, the prosecution
can delete (redact) all references in the confession
relating to the codefendant. Bruton, supra at 134 n.
10; State v. Rosen, 151 OS 339, 342, 86 NE(2d) 24,
26 (1949). Redaction, however, is not always
effective.
Third, the Bruton problem can be avoided, at
least in some instances, if the codefendant testifies at trial. Under these circumstances the defendant would have the opportunity to crossexamine the codefendant on the accuracy of the
out-of-court statement, thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The U.S. Supreme Court took this
position in Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 US 622 (1971):
"We conclude that where a codefendant takesthe
stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorable to the
defendant concerning the underlying facts, the de·
fendant has been denied no rights protected by
the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments." /d. at 629-30. See also State v. Doherty, 56
App(2d) 112, 381 NE(2d) 960 (1978).
Fourth, there is some authority for the proposition that Bruton is inapplicable when both defendants have confessed, implicating each other (inter·
locking confessions). The U.S. Supreme Court con·
sidered, but did not resolve, this issue in Parker v.
Randolph, 442 US 62 (1979). The plurality opinion ir
Parker adopted the position that Bruton was not
applicable to cases involving interlocking confessions. Only four Justices, however, joined in that
opinion and other courts have taken the contrary
position. See Hodges v. Rose, 570 F(2d) 643 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied 436 US 909 (1978); United States

Evidence Admissible Against One Party
An item of evidence may be admissible against
one party, but not against another party. In such a
case, a limiting instruction directing the jury to
use the evidence against the proper party must be
given, upon request, pursuant to Rule 105. See
also 4 Ohio Jury Instructions § 405.40 (1974) (Provisional) (several defendants); Webb v. Grimm, 116
App 63, 186 NE(2d) 739 (1961).
Most of the problems relating to this issue have
involved joint trials in criminal cases. In Bruton v.
United States, 391 US 123 (1968), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that an instruction limiting the use in a
8

v. DiGilio, 538 F(2d) 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied
429 us 1038 (1977).

ruled that where the testimony of the expert was
so crucial to the prosecution's case, and where the
prosecution did not make a showing that the experts who conducted the tests were unavailable
for trial, the testimony denied the defendant the
right to confrontation. Reardon v. Manson, 27 Grim.
L. Rptr. 2148 (D.C. Conn., 1980)

RULE 106: REMAINDER OF A WRITING
Rule 106 codifies the rule of completeness.
When one party introduces a document, a recorded
statement, or parts thereof, the opposing party
may immediately introduce the entire document or
recorded statement, parts thereof, or related
documents or statements, if fairness so requires.
In most trial situations, a party wishing to put the
opposing party's evidence in context must wait until cross-examination or the next stage of trial in
which that party is permitted to introduce
evidence. Rule 106 carves out a special exception
for documents and recorded statements; with
documents or recorded statement a party is permitted to place the opposing party's evidence "in
context" immediately. A similar provision, governing the admission of depositions at trial, is found
in Criminal Rule 15(F): "If only part of a deposition
is offered in evidence by a party, any party may
offer other parts."
There are few Ohio cases on the rule of completeness. In Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Link, 34
App 174, 170 NE 594 (1929), however, the court
commented: "It is a well-known rule of evidence
that, when a part of a document is offered in evidence by either side, the opposing side may call
for the entire contents of the document." /d. at
182, 170 NEat 596.
Rule 105 does not govern conversations. If a
party wishes to elicit additional parts of a conversation in order to put the conversation in context,
he must wait until a later stage in the proceeding
- typically, cross-examination.

Plea Bargain Statements
Under Federal Criminal Rule 11(e)(6) (See also
Ohio Evid. R. 410) a statement made by a defendant in connection with an offer to plead guilty is
inadmissible. An F.B.I. agent had been authorized
to offer the defendant a deal to a Jesser charge if
he would assist in the government probe of a kickback scheme. Although the defendant never actually entered a plea, his actions at the time indicated that he intended to accept the offer and
enter a plea. Under these facts any statement
made by him to the F.B.I. agent, authorized by the
prosecution to negotiate the deal, was not admissible against him at trial. U.S. v. Grant, 27 Grim.
L. Rptr. 2190 (8th Cir. 1980)
Confessions
During the course of a 6-hour interrogation the
police obtained a confession by misrepresenting
the strength of the evidence against the defendant
and by telling him that his confession would result
in greater leniency. The police tactics also included repeated statements that they believed the
defendant was not a bad man, that he needed
treatment for his problem, and that if he cooperated by confessing, he would receive such treatment at a nice hospital. Relying primarily on Bram
v. U.S., 168 US 532 (1897), the Court ruled that a
confession obtained "by any direct or implied
promises, however slight (or by] the exertion of improper influence" is involuntary and inadmissible.
People v. Bay, 27 Grim. L Rptr. 2461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
App. Div. 1980)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Stop and Frisk
Undercover officers purchased marijuana from a
friend of the defendant. The defendant was pres-=--ent but did not participate in the sale. After arresting the friend, the police frisked the defendant and
discovered a cylindrical object, which they suspected contained marijuana. The Court held that
the search was a legitimate stop and frisk procedure. Because the defendant was a friend of the
suspect and presumably knew that the friend was
selling drugs, the police could reasonably frisk the
defendant to assure their own safety. Since, how. ever, the police testified that they did not believe
the object was a weapon, the warrantless seizure
of suspected contraband was illegal. Dunn v.
; State, 27 Grim.
Rptr. 2099 (Fla. App. 1980)

Installation of Pen Register
The plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the defendant, a judge, from proceeding with
a contempt hearing to enforce an order requiring
the plaintiff to aid in the installation of a pen
register on the phone of a suspected gambler. In
affirming the judge's authority to make such an
order, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that under
Ohio Grim. R. 41(b), a judge may order the seizure
of "evidence of the commission of a criminal offense." The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted a comparable federal rule in U.S. v. New York Telephone
Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), and reached the same result. Also, under the authority of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 US 547 (1979), a judge has the
authority to order the search of third party premises for evidence of the commission of a crime.
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Williams, 63 OS(2d) 51,
407 N E(2d) 2 (1980)

L-:

Expert Testimony - Confrontation
..... In the defendant's trial for possession of narcot~<;Jcs, a forensic toxicologist testified as to the nar. cotic nature of the substance in question. The ex~-pert, however, based his opinion on the test re'~;sults of two other experts who had conducted the
~~J~xamination, but who did not testify. The court
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Grand Jury -

car, during an inventory search was correctly suppressed. State v. Daniel, 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2390
(Alaska Sup. Ct. 1979).

Juveniles

Because one of the general policies of Louisiana law is "to protect minors from the possible
consequences of their own immaturity," a grand
jury cannot compel a minor to testify before it,
unless he is afforded the right to counsel. Moreover, counsel may accompany minors into the
grand jury room. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
(Graham), 27 Grim. L. Rptr. 2346 (La. 1980)

Confrontation - Sentencing Stage
During the sentencing stage of a parolee's state
trial for capital murder, the trial court admitted letters and reports containing double hearsay unfavorable to the parolee. The Court held that the admission of hearsay by unidentified and possibly
unqualified declarants violated the parolee's Sixth
Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination. Although the material might have been
admissible under the statute, the Court held that
the documents were not reliable enough to meet
Sixth Amendment requirements. The Court noted
that the trial court's discretion in the admission of
evidence goes only to the relevance of the facts
sought to be proved and not to the manner of
proof. Porter v. State, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2100 (Tex.
Ct. Grim. App. 1979).

Statistical Evidence
The Court expressed its hostility to the use of
statistics to explain to the jury the possibility of a
misidentification based upon an expert's testimony. In the case, the critical link between the defendant and the crime was the scientific identification of several hairs found in a ski mask. In final
argument, the prosecutor used the expert witness'
estimate of the likelihood that two different persons' hair could be indistinguishable (one chance
in a thousand) to argue that the identification was
made beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held
that it was plain error for the prosecutor to equate
the probability of concurrence of identifying marks
with the probability of a misidentification, thus defining reasonable doubt by statistical probabilities.
U.S. v. Massey, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2049 (8th Cir.
1979).

Identification - Burden of Proof
The Maine Supreme Court has established burden of proof requirements for the admission of
identification evidence. "[W]e hold that once a defendant, as the movant in the suppression hearing
required by State v. Boyd, 294 A.2d 459 (1972),
proves by a preponderance that a pretrial identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive,
the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the corrupting effect of
the suggestive procedure is outweighed by the reli
ability of the identification as set forth in Neil v.
Biggers, [409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)]." State v.
Cefalo. 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2424 (Maihe Sup. Jud. Ct.
1979).

Automobile Inventory Searches
The need to protect property located inside a
vehicle is a constitutionally valid rationale for a
routine, noninvestigative warrantless inventory
search of a car and its contents. In impounding a
vehicle, the police may catalog all articles that are
not in closed or sealed containers. As to closed
containers, the officer should not open them, but
should merely list them as closed or locked packages, briefcases or containers. The Alaska Supreme Court stated that "inventory procedures
thus limited constitute only minimal intrusions
upon an owner's reasonable expectation of privacy
and are thus constitutionally permissible in light of
the rationales underlying police inventory searches
of impounded vehicles and .a.Jaska's constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures." In this case, evidence found after police
opened the defendant's briefcase, located in his

Testimony From a Probation Revocation Hearing
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the tes
timony of a probationer at a revocation hearing is
inadmissible as evidence against him at a later
trial on related criminal charges, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. Since U.S. Supreme Court cases give no clear answer to the
constitutional questions involved, the Court based
its holding on public policy grounds. People v.
Rocha, 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
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